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Abstract—The security in industrial automation domain using
cryptography mechanisms is being discussed in both industry
and academia. An efficient key management system is required to
support cryptography for both symmetric key and public/private
key encryption. The key management should ensure that the
device is verified before distributing the initial key parameters
to devices. The software/firmware used in the device comes from
manufacturers, therefore the initial authenticity of the device can
be easily verified with the help of manufacturers. Mobile telecom-
munication is an industrial segment where wireless devices are
being used for a long time and the security of the wireless device
management has been considered through a standard driven
approach. Therefore, it is interesting to analyse the security au-
thentication mechanisms used in mobile communication, specified
in Long-Term-Evolution (LTE) standard. This paper analyses
the initial device authentication using public key infrastructure
in LTE standard, and discusses if, where and how the studied
solutions can be tailored for device authenticity verification in
industrial plant automation systems.
Index Terms—Industrial Automation, Mobile telecommunica-
tion security, Gap Analysis, Public-Key Infrastructure
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems, which include Supervisory Con-
trol And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed
Control Systems (DCS), and Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLC), are typically used in process industries like pulp and
paper, water and wastewater, food and beverages, mining
etc. Since the last decade, the severity of cyber threats to-
wards existing and future industrial systems has increased
the security awareness in the industrial automation domain.
The level of threat has increased as the industrial systems
are being interconnected with the communication networks.
The integration of wireless devices with industrial automation
systems has also raised the device security challenges. The
state of the art in industrial communication system security
research is well captured in [1]. This provides a good overview
of the state of industrial communication security. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has provided
recommendations on how to establish secure industrial control
systems in [2]. An efficient key management is required
to support cryptography. However, the cryptography and the
key management cannot assure communication security if the
device is not verified as trusted before the key distribution.
The manufacturers provide the software/firmware for the de-
vice. From the manufacturing phase to the industrial plant
oeprations, devices are handled by different personnel based
on the roles. Therefore, there is a need to verify whether the
device has been compromised since the time manufacturer has
released the product/device. This can be done with the help of
manufacturers and the rest of the key management can be done
without the manufacturers once the device has been considered
as trusted. The secure management of certificates in industrial
sectors has been discussed in [3]. The challenges of having a
certificate management in industrial control system has been
well discussed in this paper. In [4], the mechanism to enable
plug and work of devices in industrial environment reusing the
internet of things approach has been discussed and conclusion
was that the best method to bootstrap initial credentials can
be done through manufacturer provided certificate and with a
secure device identifier based on 802.1AR [5]. This imposes
a tight constraint on manufacturers to provide devices with
secure device identity. This also might increase the manufac-
turing effort and costs as the credential generation will be
included during the production process.
Mobile telecommunication is an industrial segment where
the wireless devices are being used for a long time. In the
mobile telecommunication domain the security of wireless
device management has been considered through a standard
driven approach. In addition to this, the mobile communi-
cation domain has some similarities with industrial plants.
For example, mobile telecommunication domain also involves
embedded devices. Some of the devices, such as, home base
stations, similar to field devices may come from different ven-
dors etc. The fourth generation of mobile telecommunication
technology, known as 4G, has been evolved and based on this
technology 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership Project) LTE
standard have been proposed. The new 3GPP LTE system
is known as Evolved Packet System (EPS). The technical
specifications on 3GPP networks system security architecture,
authentication framework and Security of Home Node have
been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP) [6]–[8]. In [9] the LTE security is explained in detail.
Motivation of this paper: The device authentication using
certificates and universal subscriber module has been well
discussed in LTE standard. Therefore, it will be interesting
to learn how the device authentication is managed in LTE
and if some of those approaches can be tailored for industrial
automation plant. In [10], three different security scenarios
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from mobile telecommunications domain and their deployment
aspects have been assessed. The SIM card or certificate based
solutions in mobile telecommunication industry require a lot of
engineering either in manufacturer premises or in the industrial
plant itself. A SIM card based solution requires individual
mapping between the SIM card and the devices, which adds
extra time consuming steps in the device configuration. In this
work, we do not intend to one-to-one map every elements in
the LTE standard with the industrial automation, rather we
focus on how device authentication is managed in network
elements, such as, base station, home base stations and relay
nodes.
Contribution of this paper: The applicability assessment
of public key infrastructure used in initial device authentication
in LTE will help to assess how to use a public key infrastruc-
ture for initial device authentication in industrial plants. In
this paper, we review the device authentication using public
key infrastructure in LTE standard and understand in which
area of industrial plants this can be applied and how it can
be applied. Then we propose a concept on initial device
authenticity verification for industrial plants.
In this paper, section 2 presents an overview of public
key infrastructure usage in LTE network elements. Section
3 assesses the LTE public key infrastructure used for au-
thentication from industrial plant point-of-view. Based on this
assessment, a device authenticity verification using public key
infrastructure for industrial plant is presented in section 4.
Finally, the conclusions and future works are outlined in
section 5.
II. DEVICE AUTHENTICATION USING PUBLIC KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE OF LTE
In this section we present an overview of device authenti-
cation using public key infrastructure in base station, home
base station and relay nodes. The manufacturers and the
operators are two major roles involved in the LTE public key
infrastructure. We will study how these roles are involved
and how devices are authenticated based on this public key
infrastructure.
A. Base Station Authentication
A base station is a network element which is responsible
for radio transmission and reception in one or more cells to or
from the user equipment. The base station in LTE is known as
evolved base stations and denoted as eNodeB or eNB. Based
on the coverage area, base stations can be categorized by (1)
Macro cell which is wide area base station, (2) Micro cell
which is medium range base station, (3) Pico cell which is
local area base station and (4) Femto cell which is home base
station. The base station discussed in this section is macro base
station and an high level overview of authentication is shown
in Figure 1. The security of base station is important and as
per 3GPP standard, the base station should be authenticated
by an operator based PKI. However, the software loaded in the
base station should be authorized by both manufacturers and
operators as manufacturers provide software for base station
and operators set configuration parameters for those. In most
of the cases, the base stations are placed in a physically secure
place, however, in certain scenarios, the base station can also
be located in a location which is not physically secured. The
authentication for the base station to connect with the backhaul
link of the operator network is based on the public key
infrastructure with IKEv2 certificate based authentication. The
enrolment of the base station requires both the manufacturers
and the operators to have their own public key infrastructure
with certification authority. The base station authenticates itself
to the operator network during the enrolment procedure using
a manufacturer provided public/private key pair installed in
the base station before enrolment, a certificate on the base
station identity and the public key signed by a manufacturer
certification authority. Therefore, when the operators buy base
stations from manufactures, they also receive the unique iden-
tity and the public key of the devices signed by a manufactures
certification authority. Operators also need to install the root
certificate of the manufacturer. This should be done in a trusted
way, so that the certificates of the authorized manufacturers
only have been installed in operator network.
Figure 1. High Level View on Base Station Authentication
The base station authenticates its manufacture provided
identity to the certification authority of operator and requests
an operator signed certificate. The certification authority of
operator generates the certificate and sends it to the base sta-
tion. After authenticating the operator network certificate, the
base station installs this certificate and then uses this operator-
signed certificate to authenticate its identity to the security
gateway of the operator network. The authentication of the
operator network by the base station during enrolment would
require either provisioning of the operator root certificate in
the factory, or the installation of the operator root certificate
on-site at installation time or some complex cross-signing
relations between vendors and operators. Refer [9] and [8],
for a comprehensive overview of certificate enrolment for base
station.
B. Home Base Station Authentication
The home base station is a home version of base station
with small-area or indoor coverage. The coverage of home
base station is comparable to a wireless local area network
(WLAN) access point. These home base stations are deployed
within customer premises for efficient spectrum usage and
customer specific deployments. These devices are sold in large
numbers and deployed in home environments. The security of
these devices is important as they are deployed in customer
premises. A customer can deploy home base station on a
contract with the mobile operator and the home base station
should be authenticated with the security gateway which
controls the access to the core network of operators. The public
key infrastructure is chosen for the authentication of home
base stations. The authentication protocol IKEv2 (Internet Key
Exchange) is used between the home base station and the
security gateway. The mutual authentication between the home
base station and the security gateway is based on certificates
as shown in Figure 2. Each home base station will have a
private/public key pair and a certificate binding the identity
and other properties to the public key. The device certificate
can be issued by the operator, manufacturer or by another party
trusted by the operator. The advantage of using manufacturer
provided device certificate is that the operator is not required
to deploy a huge public key infrastructure for large number
of home base stations. However, the security gateway will
have the certificate from operator. The home base station will
authenticate itself to the security gateway with its unique
identity. The root certificate of the operator shall be pre-
provisioned to the home base station.
Figure 2. High Level View on Home Base Station Authentication
The security of home base station depends on a Trusted
Environment. The trusted environment is the logical entity
with a built-in root of trust. On power-up of the home base
station or after hard reset, first the trusted environment itself is
checked for integrity using the root of trust. Once the trusted
environment has been started successfully, it proceeds to verify
other software components of the home base station. The
trusted environment also stores sensitive parameters which are
used during operation of the home base station. The access
to the private key which is used for device authentication is
only given based on a positive device integrity result. In this
scenario, the operator is not alone responsible for the home
base station, as the manufacturer is responsible for device
integrity when signing and providing the certificate.
Certain deployment scenarios require the separate authen-
tication for the hosting party. Hosting party is the owner of
the home base station who deploys the home base station in
premises. This authentication is optional and is always pre-
ceded by a successful device authentication. The hosting party
module stores the hosting party identity and the secret. This
module is a removable token which is not physically bound to
the home base station. The hosting party authentication uses
the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) mechanism and
the authentication is based on a permanent shared secret stored
in the universal subscriber identity module (USIM) and the
home location register. Refer [9] and [7], for a comprehensive
overview of security of base station.
C. Relay Node Authentication
Relay nodes are base stations with added functionalities
which enable operators to improve and extend the coverage
area. Relay nodes are connected to the core network through
the wireless link. Relay node can play a dual role, such as,
the role of a user equipment and the role of a base station.
When the relay node plays the role of a user equipment,
the authentication is done using universal subscriber identity
module (USIM). When a relay node connects to an operator
network for the first time, it may follow the certificate enrol-
ment mechanism similar to the base station and the home base
station. To ensure mutual authentication between the USIM
and relay node, either certificate or pre-shared keys on both
sides can be used. Refer [9] and [11], for a comprehensive
overview of relay node security.
III. DISCUSSION ON APPLICABILITY OF DEVICE
AUTHENTICATION IN INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION
This section summarizes the applicability of device authen-
tication concepts in industrial automation domain as shown in
Figure 3. In base station deployment, the authentication of the
base station device is done by the public key infrastructure
of the operator. However, to enrol the base station in the
public key infrastructure of the operator, the manufacturer
provided certificate is used. Manufacturer of the base station
should generate the public/private key pair and sign the public
key and the device identity with the certificate authority
from the manufacturer. The operator also needs to install
the root certificate of the manufacturer, so that it can use
that certificate for verification. This needs an out-of-band
trusted channel between the manufacturer and the operator.
During the operational phase, the operator may need to update
the public/private key pair of the base station. This can be
done with the operator certificate. Therefore, the manufacture
provided public/private key pair and the certificate may not be
required once the device is enrolled in the operator network.
The base station can receive the certificate from operator
when it is connected with the operator network. In indus-
trial plant, there is an option of using configuration tool
during commissioning phase. Therefore, the certificate from
the operator can be put in a trusted way to the device using
configuration tool once the device is authenticated using the
manufacturer provided certificate. The unique identity and the
public key of the device is used during the enrolment of
the base station. The base station also provides a proof of
possession for the private key which belongs to the public key
to be certified.
Figure 3. Summary of device authentication concepts applicability
The security of home base station is little different than
the security of base station as the device authentication is
done using the manufacturer provided certificate. This requires
that the manufacturers need to pre-provision some data into
the home base station. Therefore, the manufacturers and the
operators need to trust each other from organization point of
view. If manufacturers do not have a certification authority
to sign the device certificate and used third party certification
authority, then the operators also need to trust that third party.
The root certificate which is used for the validation of the
certificate of home base station need to be handed to each
operator who are supporting the home base station. As in home
base station, the certificate from manufacturers are used for
authentication, the revocation of the certificates also need to
be done from the manufacturers. This implies that the man-
ufacturers will also be involved during the operational phase
of home base station regarding certification revocation. It also
requires that if the device is compromised or broken, then the
device needs to be sent to the manufacturing unit for managing
keys and certificates. Therefore the device management life-
cycle requires a chain of trust till production. In industrial
plants, there are generally different devices installed from
different manufacturers and they might have different com-
putation and functional capabilities. Hence, in our proposed
device authentication framework we can limit the initial device
authentication to the manufacturer provided certificate. Once
the operator/plant has verified that the device is not tampered
since it has produced from the manufacturing unit, the key
management mechanism specific to the plant can be used.
The managing of clock inside the home base station is
another aspect for certificate management. If the home base
station does not have any continuous clock, then the current
time should be saved in trusted environment. On subsequent
power up, the home base station can use the last saved time
directly. However, the operator needs to take care the validity
period of the network side certificate. In industrial plant, if the
certificate management is used during the operation phase of
the plant, then it is also required to investigate the certificate
validity times. If a validity time is set for a certificate, then
how to update when the certificate expires for the device, is
also an issue.
IV. DEVICE AUTHENTICITY VERIFICATION FRAMEWORK
FOR INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION - OVERVIEW
In this section, based on the applicability assessment of the
LTE public infrastructure based authentication, we present a
concept of device authenticity verification in industrial plants.
This device authenticity verification is done before the devices
are deployed within the plant environment. The role of the
components which are used in the public key based device
authentication are described along with their assumptions. The
sequence of workflow phases and the involvement of the user
are also described.
A. Objective of the Authenticity Verification Framework
The objective of this framework is to ensure that the
devices which will be deployed inside the plant have not
been tampered or compromised before they arrive inside the
plant premise. This implies that the plant is required to have
an infrastructure where devices can be verified. In industrial
plants, generally configuration tools or commissioning devices
are used to configure the device parameters. However, before
the device is configured using commissioning devices, it is
required to know the parameters on which the device can be
verified. In our framework, we consider that the industrial
plant is physically protected and only employees with valid
approval are allowed to enter in the plant. This framework
should be able to satisfy the following two goals, which we
have identified as the major objectives to get fulfilled.
• The plant system should be able to verify the identity of
the device which has been shipped from manufacturing
unit.
• The plant system should be able to detect if the device
has been tampered during the shipment.
B. System Components
The components which are involved in this verification
framework are presented below.
• Manufacturer of the Device: Manufacturers produce
the devices and install firmware in the device. The
manufacturer is assumed to be trusted component in the
framework.
• Certificate Authority of Manufacturer: The certificate
authority is responsible for managing the initial certificate
of a device. It is assumed that this certificate authority of
manufacturer cannot be compromised.
• Plant Security Manager: The plant security manager is
responsible for managing the security parameters required
for the device communication, and it monitors the state
of the security of the devices in a running plant. In
our framework scope we have assumed that this security
management component cannot be compromised.
• Device: This is the component which is verified before
gaining access in the industrial network.
• Commissioning Engineer: This person is authorized to
configure or commission devices prior to the operational
phases or during maintenance phase.
C. Proposed Framework Concept
In this proposed concept we use the concept of secure
boot-up and trust anchoring through manufacturer provided
certificate as used in LTE standard. In this approach, the
manufacturers need to share their root certificate with the plant
system. The plant system uses this root certificate to verify
the device certificate. When the device comes with the man-
ufacturer provided certificate, then the initial authentication
of device is simple as the identity of the device will be in
the certificate. In addition to it, the device contains a secure
and trusted environment which is used to install manufacturer
credentials. However, once the operator/plant has verified that
the device is not tampered since it has produced from the
manufacturing unit, the key management mechanism specific
to the plant can be used.
Figure 4. Overview of Proposed Device Authenticity Verification
Figure 4 presents an overview of the device authenticity
verification using a secure boot-up and the certificate verifi-
cation. The device contains a secure and trusted environment
which is used to install manufacturer credentials. The trusted
environment contains a ‘root of trust’ which stores the private
key and the identity of the device. It also provides trusted
functions and is used for secure boot process. Once the device
is brought inside the industrial plant and powered up, the
device checks its integrity using the root of trust. The verifi-
cation of trusted environment follows the verification method
used in LTE specification. Once the device passes the device
integrity check, then it provides its manufacturer provided
identity to the configuration tool or the commissioning device
in the industrial plant. The security management component
in industrial plant has already installed the certificate of
manufacture. The security management component transfer
this information to the configuration tool or the commissioning
device for initial device authentication.
The message flow for an initial device authentication in an
industrial plant is shown in Figure 5. The device generates
the initial authentication request with its identity and signs
the request with the manufacture provided private key. The
configuration tool verifies the signature of the device identity.
Once the verification is done, the configuration tool can verify
the integrity of the device as the private key of the device in
the trusted environment can be accessed only after a successful
secure boot-up. Once the authenticity of the device has verified
and it is found that the device has not been tampered since
its production time, the concept of initial trust bootstrapping
from employee trust [12] can be used for device deployment.
Figure 5. Message flow during initial device authentication
D. Discussion on the proposed initial authentication of the
device
In this section, we will discuss whether the two objectives
for the proposed concept of the initial authentication of the
device are satisfied.
• The first objective is to verify the manufacturer provided
identity. The configuration/commissioning tool used in
industrial automation plant verifies the device certificate
with the help of root certificate of manufacturer. The de-
vice certificate contains the manufacturer provided device
identity which is signed by the manufacturer certificate
authority.
• The second objective is to ensure that the devices which
will be deployed inside the plant have not been tam-
pered or compromised before they arrive inside the plant
premise. The secure boot in the device provides capability
of software and configuration integrity checking and
authentication. Before the software is allowed to run on
the processor, the firmware image is checked to make sure
that it has not been altered or tampered with. The hash
values of the firmware itself is signed with the private key
of manufacturer and the public key is given in the device
as part of the hardware root of trust. Therefore, if the
firmware is modified or tampered with, then the device
will not be able to get the private key of the device itself
which is stored inside the trusted environment.
Therefore, the configuration/commissioning tool can verify the
authenticity of the device, when the device sends the initial
authentication request signing with the private key of itself.
The root certificate of the manufacturers is already transferred
by an out-of-band channel to the plant security management
component. Therefore, if any attacker tampers the device
before it reaches the industrial plant premises, this can be
easily detected. In addition to it, when the authenticity of the
device is verified using the configuration tool, the employee
can commission other parameters and transfer the trust of the
employee itself. Later, the security management of the device
can be done as per the security policy in the plant. In this
initial authentication of the device, the integrity of the device
firmware is checked with the help of manufacturer provided
certificate.
Challenges: This proposed initial device verification frame-
work is meant for future industrial devices. The automation
plant should procure the devices from manufacturer where
the manufacturers provide the device certificates along with
trusted environment in the device. If the manufacturers are
not providing the device certificate and the secure trusted
environment then this framework cannot be used. In this
framework, the industrial plant needs to have an out-of-band
channel with manufacturers to receive the root certificate
of manufacturer. In industrial plant, there might be devices
from different manufacturers. This out-of-band channel with
manufacturer to receive the root certificate should be managed
carefully by the security management component in industrial
automation plant. The devices also should be able to support
secure boot process for this framework. In mobile telecom-
munication also there are devices that come from different
vendors, but the devices follow the same set of standards. This
is not the similar situation for industrial plants. Therefore,
to accommodate some industrial devices which do not have
any processing capabilities in secured framework is a real
challenge in industrial automation plant.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have explored the authentication of
base stations, home base stations and relay nodes in mo-
bile telecommunication industry. The authentication in LTE
standard for mobile telecommunication industry is based on
certificates or universal subscriber module. In this work we
focus on the LTE public key infrastructure based device
authentication mechanisms using certificates and secure en-
vironment. From the discussion, we found that the security
of base stations and home base stations in mobile telecom-
munication depend on the secure provisioning of parameters
in the secured environment from the manufacturing plant
for telecommunication equipment. This concept is used in
our proposed initial device authentication workflow as it is
required to understand how and on what parameters the device
can be considered as trusted. The manufacturer is the provider
of the software in devices, therefore it will be useful to
verify with manufacturers’ certificate whether the device has
been tampered with, since production of the device. The
use of Trusted Environment of devices for device integrity
validation is interesting area to consider as we also propose the
initial device authentication once the secured boot-up happens
through a trusted environment. Our proposed initial device
authentication is for future industrial devices and require that
the device should be provided with trusted environment and
manufacturer provided certificates. Considering the hetero-
geneous characteristics of industrial plants, the devices may
come from different manufacturers with different computation
and functional capabilities. In mobile telecommunication also
there are devices that come from different vendors, but that
all follow the same set of standards. It will be beneficial
for industrial plant security management if future industrial
plant devices could also follow a set of standards. In our next
work, we plan to explore the contact-less subscriber identity
module cards standardized for M2M (machine-to-machine)
applications. These could feasibly be installed in all new
industrial devices, protecting new and future devices. However,
this will not work for the installed base.
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